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STUDENT COMMENTS
Self-Determination and Recent
Developments in the Baltic States
I. INTRODUCTION
The principle of self-determination is a human right which has taken
its place as a peremptory norm of international law. This principle essen-
tially holds that people have the right to determine their future, to elect
and be governed by a representative government, and to be free from for-
eign domination.
This paper will focus on the Baltic nations of Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania, and their right to self-determination. Since the history of these
countries is essential to an understanding of their claims to self-determi-
nation, Part II provides a brief history of how these nations came under
Soviet domination. Part III discusses the principle of self-determination
and how it relates to the Baltic states. Parts IV and V conclude with an
in-depth look at recent events in the Baltic and the effects of resurgent
nationalism on those countries.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
While the three Baltic nations have different historical backgrounds,
all three countries were incorporated into the Russian empire by the be-
ginning of the 19th century. During this century, the Baltic people were
subjected to increasing political oppression and intense Russification
pressures which helped to foster active opposition and to strengthen their
desire for self-determination. The opportunity to achieve this objective of
self-determination occurred after World War I with the collapse of the
Russian monarchy and the simultaneous defeat of Germany.' Indepen-
dence was declared by all three republics in 1918, and was recognized by
the Treaty of Versailles.2
During their years of independence, the Baltic states established po-
1. A. ALEXizv, DISSENT AND NATIONALISM IN THE SOVIET BALTIc 3 (1983).
2. See Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, 2 Bevans 43. Their independence was also
recognized by the League of Nations which admitted each of the Baltic nations as member
states. See, e.g., J. DUGARD, REcOGNITION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 15-21 (1987).
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litical systems that proved to be stable and effective. The Baltics also
prospered economically, as evidenced by the superior standards of living
in the republics compared to that of the Soviet Union.8
The independence, however, lasted only 22 years. A secret protocol
attached to the Nazi-Soviet pact of August 1939 (the Molotov-Ribbentrop
Pact) as well as subsequent agreements, divided Europe into German and
Soviet spheres of influence. Under the terms of the agreements, the Baltic
states fell into the Soviet sphere of influence,' opening the way for the
Soviets to establish large military bases in the territory.
In June 1940, the Soviet Union used the German advance into West-
ern Europe as a pretext for insisting upon total occupation of the Baltics.
This occurred despite the Soviets' non-aggression/non-interference trea-
ties with each of the republics. In these treaties, the Soviet Union prom-
ised to protect the political independence of the republics and not to in-
terfere in their internal affairs. The Soviets waived "voluntarily and for
all time" any claims to the territories.5 In August 1940, the Soviet Union
formally annexed each of the Baltic states.
During World War II, the territories shifted between German and
Russian control. When the Baltics finally ended up in Soviet hands, a
period of brutal repression followed. Over 20,000 Estonians, 100,000 Lat-
vians, and 200,000 Lithuanians were deported to Siberia and elsewhere
from 1945 to 1946. Overall, some 600,000 Balts were deported in the mid-
to-late 1940's, a startling number considering the total population in the
region at that time was only six million.' There was an active armed resis-
tance in the area to the Soviet occupiers which was not completely sup-
pressed until 1952.
After the years of overt oppression, the Soviet Union began a policy
of increased consolidation of the Baltic republics, attempting to gradually
socialize Baltic society with Soviet political and economic norms.7 This
socialization process included persecution of religious groups in the
region."
The process also included rapid industrialization and collectivization
of agriculture in the area. The forced industrialization of the Baltics was
significantly aided by the mass importation of labor from other parts of
3. A. ALzxrEv, supra note 1, at 3.
4. See, e.g., Fein, Baltic Citizens Link Hands to Demand Independence, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 24, 1989, at A10, col. 3; Text of Secret Protocols to 1939 Hitler-Stalin Pact, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 24, 1989, at A10, col. 3; A. ALEXIEV, supra note 1, at 3-4. For a detailed discus-
sion of the Nazi-Soviet pact and its repercussions for the Baltic states, see I. VIZULIs, THE
MOLOTOV-RIBBENTROP PACT OF 1939 (1990).
5. Meissner, The Right of Self-Determination After Helsinki and its Significance for
the Baltic Nations, 13 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 375, 381 (1981).
6. A. ALEXIEV, supra note 1, at 5-6.
7. Id. at 8.
8. For a discussion of religious persecution in the Baltic republics, see I. VIZULIS, supra
note 4, at 79-81.
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the U.S.S.R. This continued influx of workers has diluted the ethnic com-
position of the region and, as a result, today Estonians and Latvians con-
stitute slim majorities in their republics.' Lithuanians account for over 80
percent of their population which helps explain why Lithuania is at the
forefront of the present separatist movement.'0 The importation of work-
ers has continued through the years, and has produced a visible backlash
of dissent and nationalism which continues to the present day.
III. THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE BALTIC STATES
Although the Soviet Union does not recognize the Baltic states'
claims to self-determination, international law does. The right to self-de-
termination is widely recognized under international law. The Charter of
the United Nations discusses the principle of self-determination; in fact,
this principle was included in the Charter upon the initiation of the So-
viet Union." The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, both recognize the right of people to self-determination. Article 1
of both Covenants states: "All people have the right to self-determina-
tion. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status
and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development."'" Be-
cause they were forcibly annexed into the Soviet Union, the Baltic people
have been unable to freely determine their political status. In addition,
the Soviet system of centralized control has prevented them from freely
pursuing their economic, social, and cultural development.1
The Resolution on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Coun-
tries and Peoples' was passed by the United Nations General Assembly
on December 14, 1960. The Declaration recognizes that all people have
the right to self-determination, and orders that the subjugation, domina-
tion, and repression of people be stopped. 5 The Declaration further con-
demns attempts to disrupt a country's national unity and territorial
integrity."
The Baltic states have been victims of Soviet colonialism for fifty
years. The Declaration Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and
9. Mlechin, Alienation, 44 NEW TIMES, Oct. 1988, at 30, 31.
10. See, e.g., id. at 30-31; Nelan, Lashed by the Flags of Freedom, TIME, Mar. 12, 1990,
at 26, 30.
11. Meissner, supra note 5, at 375.
12. U.N. Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and U.N. Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 GAOR Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966-67), quoted in Meissner, supra note 5, at 376.
13. Because the Baltic republics were annexed against their will, the legal norm of
pacta sunt servanda does not affect the legitimacy of their claims to self-determination.
The Baltic people had no vote with respect to their republics' inclusion in the Soviet Union.
14. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,
G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960).
15. See I. Vizumis, supra note 4, at 45.
16. Id.
1991
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Peoples imposes a duty on the Soviet Union to cease any further at-
tempts at colonization of the republics and to leave the Baltic states so
these republics can regain the sovereign status they possessed prior to
1940.17
The Helsinki Accords of 197518 and the Declaration on Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations19 also recognize the
right to self-determination. The Declaration on Principles of Interna-
tional Law Concerning Friendly Relations further discusses the concept
of territorial integrity. It declares that a nation must pass the require-
ment of possessing a government representing the whole people before it
is entitled to protection from any action which would disrupt its territo-
rial integrity.2 0 Arguably, the government of the Soviet Union does not
adequately represent the people of many of its republics, especially the
Baltic states.
Furthermore, the General Assembly of the United Nations has
adopted a definition of aggression which states that, "nothing in this Def-
inition . . . could in any way prejudice the right to self-determination,
freedom and independence, as derived from the Charter, of peoples forci-
bly deprived of that right .... ,"1 The Soviet annexation of the Baltics in
1940 forcibly denied the republics their right to self-determination. In
this regard, the Baltic states have a valid claim to self-determination.
In an article entitled "Self-Determination Under International Law:
Validity of Claims to Secede," Professor Nanda argues that "divergent
political beliefs, claims to resources, or ethnic or cultural identification,"
cannot be the main arguments raised in support of a group's claim to self-
determination.22 Such a situation would be too disruptive to the concept
of states and world order. Instead, Nanda argues, the focus should be on
the "nature and extent of the deprivation of human rights of the group
making the claim.1" 3 The test is the extent to which the group suffers
from "subjugation, domination and exploitation," and the extent to which
17. Id. at 47.
18. Final Act of the Conference on the Security and Co-operation in Europe [Helsinki
Accords], concluded Aug. 1, 1975, reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 1292.
19. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Co-operation Among States, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N.
Doc. A/8028 (1970).
20. Nanda, Self-Determination Under International Law: Validity of Claims to Se-
cede, 13 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 257, 260-70 (1981).
21. G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974),
quoted in Nanda, supra note 20, at 270. Despite its numerous resolutions on the right to
self-determination, the United Nations has taken little action with respect to the Baltic
states' claims to independence. The U.N. did open informal talks with representatives from
the Baltic nationalist movements for several months, but these contacts were suspended in
early 1990 because of pressure put on the U.N. by the Soviet Union. See, e.g., Lewis, U.N.,
Bowing to Soviets, Halts its Baltic Contacts, N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1990, at A14, col. 3;
Lewis, U.S. Criticizes U.N. Over Baltic Move, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1990, at A15, col. 6.
22. Nanda, supra note 20, at 277.
23. Id.
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its members are deprived of the opportunity to participate in the political
process. 2'
Each of the Baltic republics has a local congress, multi-party systems
are emerging in the republics, and several Baltic representatives have
been elected to the National Congress of People's Deputies. Moscow has
recently endorsed a plan which calls for increased participation by all the
Soviet republics in the decision-making process."' These developments,
coupled with the Soviet leadership's unfolding responses to separatist de-
mands, show that the Baltic states do today have some say in the political
process and their futures. However, the present changes in the Soviet
Union cannot alter the fact that the Baltic people have historically been,
and continue to be, subjugated, dominated, and exploited.
Not every commentator believes that the Baltic states have a right to
self-determination. Historian George Strong points out that before 1918,
each of the republics was at times part of the Russian empire. 6 If the
Soviet Union is viewed as a successor to the czarist empire, then, Strong
argues, "there is a certain historical validity to the present Soviet claim to
[the Baltic] territories.
' '2 7
Strong notes that the Baltics enjoyed independence for only 22 years,
and the Russians were not involved in the negotiation of the treaty which
recognized their independence (Versailles). As for the Nazi-Soviet non-
aggression treaty, he argues that Stalin had no alternative but to attempt
to buy time from Hitler by signing the agreement.26
Professor Strong is, however, in a substantial minority. In an article
entitled "The Right of Self-Determination After Helsinki and its Signifi-
cance for the Baltic Nations," Boris Meissner states that the Soviet an-
nexation of the Baltic states constitutes "a forcible acquisition forbidden
in modern international law."'29 He argues that even before World War II,
an international prohibition on annexation existed. Thus, the "direct ag-
gression" and forcible acquisition of the Baltics is invalid in light of this
annexation prohibition. 30 Accordingly, Meissner concludes that, "the Bal-
tic states could be considered territory that is occupied by the Soviet
Union. Legally and politically the existing governments in the three Bal-
tic states lack necessary legitimacy."'
Each of the Baltic republics possesses an ethnic homogeneity and in-
ternal unity based on a shared history, language, and culture. More im-
portantly, the people of each republic share a common vision of them-
selves as nations within clearly defined borders. This is true despite fifty
24. Id. at 278.
25. See generally infra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
26. Strong, Captive Nations?, Wash. Post, Sept. 7, 1989, at A22, col, 2.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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years of Soviet domination. As Meissner argues: "The right of self-deter-
mination cannot be consumed. As long as peoples are in the position to
protect their national unity, they collectively have a continuing right to
self-determination.""2
Izidors Joseph Vizulis, an international lawyer from Latvia, shares in
this conclusion:
[T]he principle of self-determination... seems irrefutably applicable
to the Baltic peoples. They never joined the U.S.S.R. voluntarily; they
were occupied and still are by the Soviet Union .... Their forcible
military occupation and the breach of the treaties in which the Soviet
Union pledged to respect these nations' independence and sovereign
rights cannot confer legitimacy on their seizure nor make the Baltic
states a 'legitimate part' of the Soviet Union. 2
Most Western nations have refused to recognize the Soviet annexa-
tion, and all of the Baltic republics maintain diplomatic missions in many
foreign capitals, including Washington, D.C. 4 For countries which have
not recognized the annexation de jure, the Baltic states continue to exist
as legitimate nations from the standpoint of international law. Thus, their
diplomatic missions can be viewed as the legitimate representatives of the
Baltic states."'
The articles on the right to self-determination found in the U.N.
Charter, the Human Rights Covenants, and other international agree-
ments clearly confer on the Baltic states the right to self-determination.
Of course, international law is an imperfect legal system in that it lacks a
central enforcement authority. In this regard, it is left up to individual
nations to remedy unjust situations.3 6 In the case of the Baltic republics,
this responsibility falls squarely on the shoulders of the Soviet Union.
IV. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BALTIC STATES
Mikhail Gorbachev's policies of glasnost and perestroika have pro-
vided the Baltic people with a new freedom to express themselves. This
has resulted in a situation which would have been unthinkable several
32. Id. at 383.
33. I. VIZULIS, NATIONS UNDER DuRss: THE BALTIC STATES 133 (1985).
34. In addition, Baltic nationals with Baltic passports are regularly granted entry visas
into numerous European, African, and South and Central American countries. I. VIZULIS,
supra note 4, at 145.
35. Meissner, supra note 5, at 383. James Crawford has argued that if the continued
recognition of the Baltic states by some countries signifies their continued existence as
states, then the concept which protects a state against illegal annexation has become a pe-
remptory norm in international law. J. CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 420 (1979). He also notes that the continued "existence" of the Baltic nations in
Western eyes is as much a result of cold war politics as it is of international law. Id. Now
that the cold war is "over," the seriousness of many Western nations' recognition is certainly
open to debate.
36. Meissner, supra note 5, at 382.
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years ago. Independent political groups have emerged throughout the re-
gion, including the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian Popular Fronts
(also called Movements for Perestroika), as well as a number of smaller,
more vociferous nationalist organizations. The formation of these organi-
zations has led to the emergence of something resembling a multi-party
system in the Baltics.
One of the issues which provided a major impetus for the formation
of the Popular Fronts was the deterioration of the environment in the
Baltics. A decree from Moscow calling for a tenfold expansion of open-cut
mining in Estonia drew widespread protest.8 7 Nearly all the pollution that
fouls local rivers, lakes, and the Baltic Sea is emitted by industries con-
trolled by Moscow. Many of the beaches on the Baltic coast are too pol-
luted for swimming.38
The programs of the Popular Fronts would impose heavy restrictions
and environmental standards on industries operating in the area. An
emerging international human right is the right to a clean environment,39
a right the people of the Baltic states are increasingly being denied.
An "indestructible Baltic sense of national identity"' 0 has led to un-
precedented and open protest in the Baltic states. The once-banned flags
of the former countries now fly throughout the region. In August 1989, to
mark the fiftieth anniversary of the Nazi-Soviet pact, hundreds of
thousands of Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians joined hands across
their homelands, demanding their right to "restore their independent
statehood."" At that time, a joint statement drawn up by the Popular
Fronts advocated the right of the republics to self-determination, stating
that the Soviet Union "infringed on the historical right of the Baltic na-
tions to self-determination . . . [in carrying] out their violent
annexations.'42
In July 1989, the Soviet government did acknowledge that "there was
a secret protocol" in the Nazi-Soviet pact.'" In December of that year, the
Congress of People's Deputies declared the protocol to be illegal, stating,
in effect, that the incorporation of the Baltic states was itself illegal."
37. See, e.g., Preston, Rising Demands in the Baltics, Sydney Morning Herald, re-
printed in WORLD PRESS REVIEW, June 1989, at 13. For a discussion of the effects of the
environment on nationalism in the Soviet Union, see Panel on Nationalism in the U.S.S.R.:
Environmental and Territorial Aspects, SOVIET GEOGRAPHY, June 1989, at 441.
38. See, e.g., The Cracks Within, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 28, 1988, at 46, 48.
39. See, e.g., Report of the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev. 1 (1974) [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration], reprinted in
11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972); THE WORKING GROUP FOR ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (BONN), THE RIGHT
TO A HUMAN ENVIRONMENT: PROPOSAL FOR AN ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE EUROPEAN
HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTION (1973).
40. Preston, supra note 37, at 13.
41. Fein, supra note 4, at A10, col. 3.
42. Id.
43. See New Future, New Past on Baltic, N.Y. Times, July 28, 1989, at A26, col. 1.
44. See Soviet Assembly Finds Protocols to 1939 Pact With Nazis Illegal, Boston
1991
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While this development can be seen as another attempt by the Soviet
Union to exorcise its Stalinist past, the Kremlin remains opposed to
granting the republics full independence. As President Gorbachev once
stated to Estonian officials, "in the case of divorce, it is not important
whether the marriage was contracted legally or not. The property must be
divided nonetheless.""'
The Soviet government has tolerated for the most part the recent
developments in the Baltic states, if not aided them. One of the most
remarkable occurrences took place in July 1989, when the Supreme Soviet
endorsed a plan which allows Lithuania and Estonia to develop market-
oriented economies independent of the central plan. More specifically, the
two republics will trade with the rest of Soviet Union almost as if they
were foreign countries, trading through contracts rather than being allot-
ted materials under Moscow's state plan." This development "allow[s]




The plan theoretically allows the republics to control their own budg-
ets, tax policies, financial markets and foreign trade. The Baltic states
hope to develop market economies based on agriculture and light indus-
try, resembling Finland or Sweden more than the traditional, centralized
Soviet model. 8
Critics of the plan say that it will divide the country, and that it
gives too much preferential treatment to the Baltics.4" Much of the oppo-
sition pertains to a provision that will allow the republics to control their
own natural resources, a provision which conflicts with the Soviet consti-
tution.60 However, supporters of the plan in the central government be-
lieve that it will create a showplace of economic change, and will bring
foreign investment which will benefit the entire Soviet economy."
The Popular Fronts enjoy tremendous support, and are even estab-
lishing some international ties. Leaders of the Fronts have met with polit-
ical organizations from Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the United
States, among others. Representatives from the Baltic republics have
helped mediate the ongoing conflict between Armenians and Azerbaijanis
in the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Resourcefulness such as this has led
Globe, Dec. 25, 1989, at 41, col. 1. See also U.S. Criticizes U.N. Over Baltic Move, supra
note 21, at A15, col. 8.
45. Serrill, War of Nerves, TIME, April 2, 1990, at 26, 28.
46. Anderson & Bogert, Crises Around the Clock, NEwswEEK, Aug. 7, 1989, at 30, 31.
47. Id. at 30.
48. Keller, Soviet Parliament Backs Autonomy for the Baltics, N.Y. Times, July 28,
1989, at Al, col. 3.
49. See, e.g., id. at Al, col. 6; Keller, More Autonomy for the Baltics Stirs Discomfort
in Moscow, N.Y. Times, July 27, 1989, at A10, col. 1; Anderson & Bogert, supra note 46, at
31.
50. See More Autonomy for the Baltics Stirs Discomfort in Moscow, supra note 49, at
A10, col. 2.
51. Id. at A10, col. 1, 2.
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some to view the Popular Fronts as being a step ahead of the central
government. Moscow often ends up expressing its support and pledging
its cooperation for Baltic initiatives.2
Recognizing the enormity of the Baltic problem, President
Gorbachev made an unprecedented trip to Lithuania in January 1990, in
an attempt to personally persuade the people of the republic to stay
within the Soviet Union. 53 Once there, he declared that the Soviet consti-
tution grants each republic the right to secede. However, he also pressed
the idea of a "federation" and warned of the possibly tragic consequences
of secession. While on the one hand stating that he was "for self-determi-
nation all the way to secession from the Soviet Union,""' he also insisted
that, "You [the Lithuanians] are going nowhere. You cannot leave the
Soviet Union."5
Very little was settled during President Gorbachev's three-day trip to
Lithuania. Indeed, two months after Gorbachev's visit, a chain of events
began which brought relations between Moscow and Lithuania to a flash
point. On March 11, 1990, the newly-elected Lithuanian Parliament voted
unanimously to restore their country's prewar independence. Four days
later, the Soviet Parliament passed a resolution declaring Lithuania's se-
cession invalid and illegal, and directing President Gorbachev to use any
means necessary to protect Soviet citizens and interests in the republic.5 6
Soon after passage of the resolution, additional Soviet troops were
sent to Lithuania, and a convoy of military vehicles rolled through the
capital of Vilnius in a show of force. 7 President Gorbachev ordered all
Lithuanians to turn in their firearms, and ordered the Vilnius government
to halt its plan for a self-defense force.58 On March 27, 1990, armed So-
viet troops stormed a Vilnius hospital and arrested Lithuanian deserters
from the Soviet army who had taken refuge there. The troops also "se-
cured" the local Communist party headquarters in what became
52. See, e.g., Mlechin, The Popular Front, 43 NEW TIMES, Oct. 1988, at 25, 26.
53. This trip marked the first time a Soviet leader has visited Lithuania since its forced
annexation. For a run-down of Gorbachev's trip to the republic, see Fein, Gorbachev Urges
Lithuania to Stay With Soviet Union, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1990, at Al, col. 6; Keller,
Buying Time in Lithuania, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1990, at Al, col. 2.
54. Gorbachev Assures Lithuania, Rocky Mtn. News, Jan. 12, 1990, at 3, col. 1.
55. Getting Out of the U.S.S.R.?, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 22, 1990, at 32.
56. See, e.g., Fein, Soviet Congress Rejects Lithuanian Secession Move, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 16, 1990, at A6, col. 1.
57. See, e.g., Fein, Lithuania Assails Moscow's Tactics As Convoy Arrives, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 23, 1990, at Al, col. 6; Serrill, supra note 45, at 26.
58. See, e.g., Serrill, supra note 45, at 26; Clines, Gorbachev Pressing Lithuanians To
Shun Any Self-Defense Plans, N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1990, at AS, col. 1. Not surprisingly,
both of these directives were overwhelmingly ignored. Only a handful of firearms were
turned in, and the Vilnius government has announced plans to draft all young Lithuanian
men into its own defense force, in order to give them legal shelter from the Soviet military
draft. See, e.g., Serrill, supra note 45, at 26; Keller, To Thwart Moscow's Draft, Lithuania
Proposes Its Own, N.Y. Times, July 19, 1990, at A8, col. 1.
1991
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Gorbachev's first use of armed force against the republics.5 9
Moscow's most overt and successful attempt to force Lithuania to
retreat from its declaration of independence came in April 1990, when the
Kremlin shut off the oil pipeline that serves as the principal supply of oil
for the republic."0 The cut-off highlighted Lithuania's dependence on
Moscow for energy sources, and Moscow's ability to exert tremendous ec-
onomic and political pressure on all of the republics. Soon there began a
long series of negotiations in which President Gorbachev indicated that
Lithuania could obtain independence in two years if it suspended its dec-
laration of independence. 1 In June, a compromise was reached in which
the Lithuanian Parliament voted to suspend its declaration of indepen-
dence in exchange for Moscow's agreement to negotiate on the indepen-
dence issue, while lifting all economic sanctions against the republic.
62
The following day, the pipeline was reopened.
Unfortunately, this compromise failed to produce a long-term solu-
tion to the strife between the Kremlin and Lithuania. On January 13,
1991, Soviet troops took over Vilnius newspaper offices and radio and tel-
evision stations in armed attacks which left fourteen Lithuanians dead.
The Soviet troops had ostensibly been sent to the republic in a further
attempt to round up draft resisters; however, once there, the army took
on an increasingly aggressive posture. 3
No one in the Kremlin has taken responsibility for giving the order
to fire on the civilians. Moscow has, however, endorsed the action, assert-
59. See, e.g., Clines, Soviet Troops, Storming Hospital, Seize Lithuanian Army De-
serters, N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1990, at Al, col. 1; Clines, Lithuanian Police Guard Parlia-
ment As Pressure Rises, N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 1990, at Al, col. 8. For a discussion of the
significance of the Soviet draft with respect to Baltic nationalism, see Fein, In the Baltics,
the Red Army is a Red-Flag Issue, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1991, at E3, col. 2.
60. See Fein & Russell, Lithuanians Say Moscow Has Cut Off Main Oil Pipeline, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 19, 1990, at Al, col. 7.
61: See Fein, Gorbachev Offers Deal to Lithuania, N.Y. Times, May 25, 1990, at Al, col
5. With this statement, Gorbachev proposed a timetable for independence much shorter
than the possibly five year period envisioned in the Soviet law on secession. See generally
infra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
62. See Clines, Soviets Open Line for Lithuania Oil to Help End Crisis, N.Y. Times,
July 1, 1990, at I1, col. 6. While the compromise reflects President Gorbachev's personal
powers of persuasion as well as Moscow's economic and political leverage, it also shows the
Kremlin's inability to fully resolve the issue of its relationship with the republics. Each
crisis is met with an ad hoc response which fails to provide a long-term solution. The Krem-
lin is clearly hoping that the newly-empowered Federation Council presents such a solution.
See generally infra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
63. For a run-down of the events surrounding the killings in Lithuania, see Whitney,
Lithuania Rallies Become Peaceful, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1991, at All, col. 1; Keller, Soviet
Army Raids Lithuania Offices, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1991, at Al, col. 1; Keller, Lithuania
Braces to Resist Any Attempt to Seize Control, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1991, at Al, col. 3;
Keller, Soviet Loyalists in Charge After Attack in Lithuania; 13 Killed; Crowds Defiant,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1991, at Al, col. 6; Whitney, Gorbachev Blames Separatist Group for
Baltic Clash, N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1991, at A4, col. 1; Keller, Lithuanian Dead Buried as
Martyrs, N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1991, at A4, col. 1.
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ing that the Vilnius government has allowed ethnic and economic strife to
bring the republic to the brink of civil war. Moscow has also argued that
such steps were necessary to protect ethnic minorities against violence
from the Lithuanians.6 4 Nevertheless, the Kremlin has pledged that it will
not attempt to overthrow the Vilnius government and that it seeks a
peaceful and political solution to the crisis, a pledge that is certainly sus-
pect in light of recent events.
The crackdown in Lithuania has led to fears of military force also
being used in Latvia and Estonia. 5 Indeed, following Lithuania's lead,
Latvia and Estonia have had their own confrontations with Moscow. The
Latvian Parliament issued a declaration of independence on March 30,
1990, and the Estonian Parliament issued one of its own on May 4,
1990.66 Unlike Lithuania, however, which declared full and immediate in-
dependence, the declarations of the Latvian and Estonian Parliaments
call for a moderate, piecemeal approach to independence. 7 In effect, the
Latvian and Estonian governments have not attempted to enforce their
declarations, hoping instead to enter into meaningful dialogue with the
Kremlin on the issue. Despite this, President Gorbachev has issued a de-
cree proclaiming the Latvian and Estonian declarations to be null and
void, and has stated that such declarations are a "violation of constitu-
tional norms."68
In arguing that the republics' declarations of independence are ille-
gal, President Gorbachev refers to a law on secession which was passed by
the Soviet Parliament in April 1990. Under the terms of the law, a repub-
64. See, e.g., Gorbachev Blames Separatist Group for Baltic Clash, supra note 63, at
Al, col. 2; Keller, Moscow's Envoy Seeks to Reassure Lithuania, N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1991,
at A4, col. 1.
65. See, e.g., Clines, Wider Crackdown is Feared in Baltics, N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1991,
at Al, col. 1. These fears were realized in Latvia on January 20, 1991, when special Soviet
troops raided the Latvian Interior Ministry building in the capital of Riga, killing four peo-
ple. See Schemann, Soviet Commandos Stage Latvia Raid; 4 Civilians Killed, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 21, 1991, at Al, col. 1. Both Latvia and Estonia have National Salvation Committees of
their own, and both Committees seek direct rule in the republics from the Kremlin. As in
Lithuania, these groups may be instigating violent incidents in an attempt to create an at-
mosphere of civil strife, thereby providing Moscow with a pretext to intervene. See, e.g.,
Clines, Latvia's Leader Tries to Placate the Kremlin, N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1991, at A4, col.
4.
66. Prior to its declaration of independence, the Estonian Parliament declared state
property to be the property of Estonia, not the U.S.S.R. This was followed by a resolution
accusing the Soviet Union of "aggression, military occupation and annexation of the Esto-
nian republic," and declaring the annexation to be illegal. See, e.g., Mlechin, supra note 9,
at 26; Estonians Challenging Soviet Rule, Rocky Mtn. News, Nov. 14, 1989, at 3, col. 4.
67. See, e.g., Keller, Gorbachev Speaks of Retaliation Over Latvia's Independence
Move, N.Y. Times, May 6, 1990, at Al, col. 6; Gorbachev Denounces Estonia's Declaration,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1990, at A2, col. 4. For a history of the constitutional developments
which took place in Estonia between January 1988 and March 1989, see Gryazin, Constitu-
tional Development in Estonia in 1988, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 141 (1990).
68. See Gorbachev Denounces Estonian Declaration, supra note 67, at A2, col. 4; Kel-
ler, supra note 67, at Al, col. 6.
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lic may secede only after a referendum is approved by two-thirds of the
voters in the republic, followed by a transition period of up to five years
during which the republic must satisfy all financial and territorial claims,
which are subject to the final approval of the Soviet Parliament.6 Such
terms obviously do not meet with any of the Baltic states' approval. In
any event, the republics argue that the secession law does not apply to
them, as they were forcibly annexed by the Soviet Union. 0
While the Soviet law on secession is a powerful tool with which to
keep the republics in line, President Gorbachev seems to be pinning his
hopes on saving the union based on a new union treaty, combined with
the sweeping new powers of his presidency. The draft of the new Treaty
of Union declares the Soviet Union to be a voluntary association of sover-
eign republics, with local republics' laws taking precedence over union
law, subject to certain crucial exceptions. 7' The Kremlin retains control
over the military, foreign affairs, and a wide range of economic matters.
Significantly, Moscow is also responsible for maintaining order within the
Soviet Union, a provision which could easily be used as a pretext for a
crackdown on disruptive republics.72
The Soviet Parliament endorsed the Union Treaty on December 24,
1990, and it must now be approved by the republics in order to be legally
binding.73 The three Baltic states refused to participate in negotiations
concerning the drafting of the treaty, and have indicated that they will
not sign it under any circumstances. Such a position should gain wide-
spread acceptance with the citizens of the Baltics, who overwhelmingly
approved independence referendums in each of the republics in February
and March 1991."1
69. For a discussion of the Soviet law on secession, see Keller, supra note 67, at A21,
col. 3; Fein, supra note 61, at A8, col. 3; Clines, supra note 62, at A6, col. 1; Serrill, supra
note 45, at 27.
70. See, e.g., Keller, supra note 67, at A21, col. 3; Fein, supra note 61, at A8, col. 3.
71. See, e.g., Church, Depths of Gloom, TIME, Nov. 26, 1990, at 40, 42; What a Mess,
THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 17, 1990, at 60, 63; Dobbs, Moscow Orders National Vote on Future
of Soviet Union, Boston Globe, Dec. 25, 1990, at 1, col. 3.
72. See, e.g., Church, supra note 71, at 42; What a Mess, supra note 71, at 63.
73. See Dobbs, supra note 71, at 42, col. 4. Originally, the legislatures of the republics
were to vote on the treaty. The Soviet Parliament has recently indicated, however, that the
vote may include all citizens of the republics.
In an effort to gauge public opinion with respect to the Union Treaty, President
Gorbachev put a vaguely worded referendum to the Soviet people on March 17, 1991. While
approximately 77% of those who voted endorsed the referendum for "preserv[ing] the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics,"
the significance of this result is limited. Most importantly, the voting was boycotted by six if
the fifteen Soviet republics, including each of the Baltic republics. See Cline, Gorbachev
Given a Partial Victory in Voting on Unity, N.Y. Times, March 19, 1991, at A4, col. 6.
74. On March 3, 1991, the citizens of Latvia and Estonia voted overwhelmingly in sup-
port of non-binding referendums calling for complete independence of their republics. In
Latvia, about 77% of the voters supported independence, while the corresponding figure in
Estonia was approximately 78%. See Dobbs, Latvians, Estonians Vote to Support Inde-
pendence, Wash. Post, March 4, 1991, at A8, col. 3. In a similar referendum in Lithuania in
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In conjunction with the new Union Treaty, President Gorbachev
hopes to use his executive powers to stem the separatist tide in the re-
publics. On December 25, 1990, the Soviet Parliament endorsed a plan
which expanded the President's authority. His new powers include the
ability to preside over the Federation Council, comprised of the leaders of
each of the republics."" The Federation Council has historically been a
weak body, but under the new plan it will possess broad powers to coordi-
nate relations between Moscow and the republics, effectively making it
the most important decision-making body in the Soviet Union. 6 Through
the Federation Council, Gorbachev hopes to convince the Baltic leaders
that they have an effective voice in the government, and that they all
possess a shared set of interests. The Baltic states, however, have refused
to participate in the old Council except as observers, and it is likely they
will resist the new Council as well.
The Baltic states are aware that their independence will not come in
one drastic step, if it comes at all. Thus, these republics must first negoti-
ate a radically different relationship with Moscow, a "special status" for
the republics. This could take the form of a confederal relationship much
like that envisioned by President Gorbachev, whereby the republics
would be provided more autonomy to create democratic institutions, a
multi-party system, and a market economy, while remaining subject to a
wide range of Soviet laws."
It is possible that the nationalist movements are too nationalistic,
that is, that they are prejudiced against non-Balts. Discrimination is un-
doubtedly taking place against the "imported," Russian-speaking minor-
ity in the Baltics .7  The suggestion has even been made that the "mi-
grants" be paid to leave the region, an idea which has been strongly
disavowed by the Popular Fronts.
79
February 1991, about 90% of the voters supported independence. Id. The higher number in
Lithuania reflects the republic's comparatively higher ethnic homogeneity.
75. See Remnick, Soviets O.K. Expansion of Gorbachev's Authority, Boston Globe,
Dec. 26, 1990, at 1, col. 5. It is hoped that the new government framework will put an end to
the so-called "war of legislation" between the republics and Moscow, whereby the Kremlin
issues a law which is then declared null and void by the republican legislatures. For a dis-
cussion of the war of legislation, see When the Juggling Has to Stop, THE ECONOMIST, Nov.
24, 1990, at 47; What a Mess, supra note 71, at 60; Church, Time of Troubles, TIME, Nov.
12, 1990, at 44; Masters, Baltic Independence: A Dream Kept Fresh, Wash. Post, July 9,
1989, at A20, col. 1.
Despite prevailing on his plan for the Federation Council, Gorbachev did lose in an
attempt to create a presidential organ specifically designed to ensure that the republics
comply with Soviet laws. See Remnick, supra note 75, at 1, col. 5.
76. See, e.g., When the Juggling Has to Stop, supra note 75, at 41.
77. See, e.g., Lewis, The Estonian Test, N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1989, at A19, col. 1. This is
not unprecedented. Some states in the U.S.S.R. already operate on a federalist basis, with
their local governments enjoying a great deal of autonomy. The Ukraine and Byelorussia, as
sovereign republics, are members of the United Nations. Mlechin, supra note 52, at 28.
78. For an argument that the Popular Fronts are not respecting the rights of non-Baits,
see Mlechin, supra note 9, at 30; Nelan, supra note 10, at 32-33.
79. Mlechin, supra note 9, at 31.
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The perceived prejudice of the Popular Fronts has led to the forma-
tion of "Russian" opposition groups called National Salvation Fronts, as
well as the International Movement (Intermovement) and the Council of
Work Collectives. These groups feel threatened by Baltic initiatives (e.g.,
national language and citizenship requirements), and have called on Pres-
ident Gorbachev to impose direct presidential rule on the republics.8 0
Some of the Popular Fronts' schemes do seem to promote discrimination
on the basis of nationality. Thus, there is a danger of not only the Soviet
Union being split on the basis of nationality, but the Baltic states as well.
Many observers believe that the nationalist movements cropping up
throughout the Soviet Union could bring about the demise of the Soviet
empire.8 ' One commentator has noted that, "if an empire is rated by its
control over far-flung peoples and territories, then the resurgence of na-
tionalism in the Soviet Union obviously signifies weakening central con-
trol."8' 2 While predictions of the collapse of the Soviet Union appear to be
alarmist, it is clear that the central government must respond adequately
to its "nationalities" problem. President Gorbachev has acknowledged
that the nationalities problem is one of the "most fundamental and vital
issues" facing his country; however, the resurgent nationalism presents
him with a dilemma. The more he encourages glasnost and perestroika,
the greater the danger that ethnic aspirations will become uncontrollable.
Thus far, the situation in the Baltics has not erupted into ethnic vio-
lence and social anarchy; it has instead taken the form of peaceful pro-
tests and parliamentary debate.88 However, the Baltic people have be-
come more assertive and radical in their positions. They now call for not
only more freedom from Moscow, but complete independence." There is
a real danger that an uncompromising line from the republics will inspire
a crackdown from Moscow, which has described recent events in the re-
publics as a threat to "the very viability of the Baltic nations." 85
While acknowledging that his reforms have "brought to light a lot of
problems ... in interethnic relations," President Gorbachev "condemn[s]
attempts at artificial aggravation of these questions, and advancing ulti-
matum demands."8 6 There has been a noticeable shift to hard-line rheto-
80. See, e.g., id. at 33; Keller, supra note 64, at A4, col. 1; Keller, Lithuania Told to
Yield or Face Worse Hardship, N.Y. Times, Jan. 15 1991, at Al, col. 1.
81. With 15 republics (in addition to other "sub-republics") having conferred upon
themselves varying degrees of autonomy, it is apparent that the future Soviet Union will be
much different from that to which we have grown accustomed since World War II. For an
argument that the Soviet Union will not be able to hold onto all of it republics, see Nelan,
supra note 10, at 26; Lewis, Hold People Power, N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1990, at A23, col. 1.
82. Schurman, Evil Empire May End in Ethnic Squabbling, Rocky Mtn. News, Oct.
19, 1989, at 47, col. 1.
83. See, e.g., Kohan, Cry Independence, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 21, 1989, at 28.
84. Fein, supra note 4, at A10, col. 1.
85. Dobbs, Estonia Voids Anti-Russian Voting Law, Wash. Post, Oct. 6, 1989, at A20,
col. 1.
86. The Cracks Within, supra note 38, at 46, 47.
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ric coming from the Kremlin, with Gorbachev, the head of the KGB, and
the commander of the Soviet Baltic Fleet all warning of possibly further
bloodshed in the republics.
8 7
Warnings such as these have not gone completely unheeded in the
republics8s The independence movements have been relatively orderly
and democratic thus far. The Kremlin is attempting to alleviate the crisis
in the Baltics by appeasing the republics with more autonomy, while
warning them not to push too hard. However, these measures are only
short-term solutions; a new federal structure must be created if Moscow
is to maintain control over all of the republics.
V. CONCLUSION
While certain developments reflect Soviet recognition of more auton-
omy for theBaltic republics, this does not mean that Moscow is willing to
accept their calls for self-determination. As Professor Nanda points out,
territory and resources constitute a state's power base, and it is unlikely
that a state will willingly part with any of them.8 9 The Baltics are an area
rich in agriculture and industry, and President Gorbachev will not let
them just leave the Soviet economy. Furthermore, allowing secession will
only promote the other nationalist movements in the Soviet Union, and
will probably mark the end of Gorbachev's rule.
Thus, while international law recognizes the right of the Baltic states
to self-determination, it is highly-unlikely that they will be able to fully
realize this right. Of course, nothing can be taken for granted in light of
87. See, e.g., Keller, Gorbachev Urged to Consider Crackdown in Republics, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 20, 1990, at A3, col. 3; Remnick, KGB Chief Says Soviets Must Prepare for
"Bloodshed," Boston Globe, Dec. 23, 1990, at 2, col. 1; Soviet Officer Warns of Force in
Baltics, Boston Globe, Dec. 27, 1990, at 18, col. 3. President Gorbachev recently stated that,
"where the situation becomes especially tense and there is a serious threat to the state and
people's welfare, I will have to introduce a state of emergency presidential rule." Keller,
supra note 87, at A3, col. 4. Comments such as these have increased fears of a return to
authoritarian rule in the Soviet Union, and prompted the resignation of Foreign Minister
Eduard Shevardnadze in protest.
A further indication that the Kremlin may be reverting to its old, hard-line policies is
President Gorbachev's recent suggestion that a Soviet law on freedom of the press be sus-
pended. See, e.g., Fein, Gorbachev Urges Curb on Press Freedom, N.Y. Times, Jan. 17,
1991, at A4, col. 4. The policies of glasnost and perestroika have certainly suffered setbacks
recently, with the takeovers of Lithuanian and Latvian media centers, and the grossly inac-
curate media coverage of the crackdown in those republics. See, e.g., id.; Clines, Curbs on
Soviet Press Hint at Retrenchment, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1991, at A4, col. 1; Fein, Credibil-
ity, Too, Is a Victim of the Repression in Vilnius, N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1991, at A5, col. 1;
Whitney, Glasnost Not Public Accountability, Censorship on Baltic Troops Shows, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 18, 1991, at A4, col. 1.
88. In a possible response to the Kremlin's new hard line, the Lithuanian Parliament
recently dropped its demand for the signing of a protocol on the goals and conditions of its
negotiations with Moscow on Lithuanian independence, as a condition precedent to such
negotiations. See, e.g., Lithuania Eases Stand, Seeks New Talks With Soviets, Boston
Globe, Dec. 29, 1990, at 2, col. 5.
89. Nanda, supra note 20, at 263.
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the remarkable changes presently taking place in Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union. However, the Kremlin does have significant political and
economic pressures it can exert should it so desire. Furthermore, if the
Baltic states push too hard, too fast (i.e., by increasing violence in the
liberation movements), it is likely that Soviet -troops will continue to
crackdown in the republics.
Arguably, the economies of the Baltic republics are so intertwined
with the Soviet Union that it is not even possible for them to go it alone
at present. As the leader of the Estonian Green Movement has stated:
"We can decide to be separate and free, but what will we do the next
morning? Everything has been damaged by fifty years of Soviet adminis-
tration. We have to reach a standard of living first that would make it
possible to raise the question of secession." 90 These sentiments are echoed
by an Estonian Front leader, who states: "[W]e must find a clever way to
coexist and create conditions which would make the Soviet Union inter-
ested in our independence."9 1 It remains unclear whether Gorbachev's re-
cent initiatives will provide the framework necessary to appease all sides.
While they are Gorbachev's boldest initiatives to date with respect to the
republics, the Baltic states appear unwilling to accept them.
While many Western governments do not recognize the incorporation
of the Baltics into the Soviet Union, the republics should not expect too
much help from them. Most governments which have not recognized the
annexation of the Baltics (such as the United States) also have not recog-
nized their declarations of independence.99 The West favors Gorbachev
and his reforms, and thus will avoid doing anything that will weaken him
domestically and give the hard-liners in the Kremlin reason to again seize
control.
Thus, it appears that at present, the Baltic states and the Soviet
Union will have to find a way to peacefully coexist. The best that the
Baltic people can hope for is a continued increase in political and eco-
nomic autonomy, while remaining republics within the Soviet Union.
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